







Vertical integration and exclusivities  




Pedro Cantos-Sánchez, Rafael Moner-Colonques, 













Center for Operations Research 
and Econometrics 
 





 CORE DISCUSSION PAPER   
2011/15 
 
Vertical integration and exclusivities  
in maritime freight transport 
 
Pedro CANTOS-SÁNCHEZ1, Rafael MONER-COLONQUES
2,  
José J. SEMPERE-MONERRIS






A  key  recent  theme  in  maritime  freight  transport  is  the  involvement  of  shipping  lines  in 
terminal management. Such investments are costly but allow liners to provide better service. 
Most of these new terminals are dedicated terminals but some are non-exclusive and let rivals 
access them for a fee. In this paper, we show that a shipping line that builds its own terminal 
finds it strategically profitable i) to continue routing part of its cargo through the open port 
facilities, and ii) to keep its terminal non-exclusive. In this way, the liner investor pushes part 
of the rival's freight from the open to the new terminal. Besides, under non-exclusivities, the 
shipping  lines  offer  a  wider  variety  of  services,  total  freight  increases  and  the  resulting 
equilibrium fares are higher than with a dedicated terminal. 
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Over the last decades the liner shipping market has witnessed extensive changes both in
sea transport and the stevedoring market. The move towards increasingly converging and
integrating markets has produced a substantial growth in the scope of activities performed
by carriers, in terms of geographic coverage, frequency of services, faster transit time and
supply chain management. An increase in the complexity of the maritime logistics chain has
indeed occurred. The usual competition between individual shipping companies and between
ports has changed to competition between logistics chains (Suykens and Van de Voorde, 1998),
basically composed of three large sections: the purely maritime services, the freight handling
in the port and the hinterland services. An improved organization of these sections becomes
fundamental regarding what "product" is o⁄ered by a shipping line at a particular port. A key
recent theme is the involvement of shipping companies in terminal management. The objective
of our paper is to analyze the derived e⁄ects of vertical integration between maritime services
and terminal port activities on prices, demand and pro￿ts; we wish to assess whether it is
strategically pro￿table for a shipping line to have a dedicated terminal and/or continue to
employ the port￿ s open infrastructure.1
The port and maritime industry has recently evolved toward various forms of concentration
and cooperation. The main types are: horizontal cooperation between shipping companies,
horizontal cooperation between terminal operating companies (TOCs), and vertical coopera-
tion between TOCs and shipping companies (see e.g. Heaver et al., 2001). As a consequence
of port reform, and over the last couple of decades there has been a decrease in the num-
ber of state-owned terminal facilities. This process of port privatization has led to private
investment in container terminals, as a means to overcome shortages in port infrastructures.2
Mega-vessels cannot be handled at all terminals, thus bringing about a signi￿cant increase in
stevedoring costs, and the loading/unloading operations require more time. With a growing
complexity in global transport networks, managing the factor time becomes crucial for cur-
rent liner service design. Shorter waiting times and delays redound in bene￿ts to customers
that save on logistics costs (Notteboom, 2006). Speci￿cally, Wilmsmeier et al (2006) ￿nd
that port e¢ ciency is the most determinant element, followed by port infrastructure, private
1We shall refer to open port facilities to mean that any shipping line can access them on equal conditions,
regardless of the type of property, be them public or be them independently operated multi-user facilities.
2Midoro et al. (2005) survey the recent history of liner shipping and talk about one evolution (growth in
vessel size and in ports) and three revolutions (containerisation, intermodal ship-rail transport, and tranship-
ment). The current wave of the integration and globalization of the terminal business and liners is to be put
in the transhipment revolution.
1sector participation and inter-port connectivity. Doubling port e¢ ciency in a pair of ports
involved in bilateral trade has the same impact on international transport costs as halving the
distance between them. All these factors have driven liners to control a number of terminal
facilities all over the world. Within the structural evolution in ports, many shipping lines have
established their own terminal operating branch. To illustrate, the APMoller-Maersk group
operates approximately 50 container terminals around the world. This certainly introduces an
element of strategy in such vertical integration arrangements. In particular, a key decision for
carriers is whether to manage a dedicated terminal (and thus keep it exclusive) or whether
to have a terminal accessible to all users (thus keeping it non-exclusive). Indeed, most global
carriers run their own terminals; others are shifting to common-user (non-exclusive) terminals,
as done by Maersk creation of AP Moller Terminals and Japanese Yusin Kaisha. Of course,
the shipping line can operate through any port terminal.3
The liner shipping market has a number of characteristics, of which the following stand out.
First, it is an oligopolistic market: the top 20 carriers account for over 80% of vessel capacity.
Second, mergers and cooperation agreements have been common in the past few years. Since
the 90s, the formation of strategic alliances permits carriers to pool vessels on main commercial
routes and pro￿t from scope and network economies. Shipping companies now establish forms
of vertical integration to get a tighter grip on logistics chains, in particular, as a means of
gaining control over port capacity (Van de Voorde and Vanelslander, 2009). The emergence of
dedicated container terminals over the last years may be due to the increasing gap between the
objectives of ports and those of shipping lines. Haralambides et al. (2002) provide a detailed
discussion and analysis of the costs and bene￿ts of dedicated terminals. Third, organizing the
transport of freight by sea involves a number of di⁄erent agents: freight forwarders, port actors
(cargo handlers, stevedores, and shipping agents), shipping companies and inland transport
providers. Vertical integration can help companies run their business more e¢ ciently.4 Fourth,
in the strong competition environment that characterizes the industry, product di⁄erentiation
(through a wider range of services o⁄ered) has a strong in￿ uence on performance (Panayides,
2003).
This paper develops an oligopoly model with vertical relations that accounts for the afore-
mentioned characteristics of the maritime freight industry. The ￿rms upstream are the ship-
3The importance of market power and the integration of activities in the maritime sector are made clear
by two recent OECD works by FrØmont (2009) and Van de Voorde and Vanelslander (2009).
4There are pure TOCs and also other forms of partnerships between shipping lines and stevedores (such
as joint ventures, contracts, the creation of partially owned subsidiaries, and so on). See SoppØ et al. (2009)
for a recent review on reasons leading to the integration of vertical activities.
2ping lines that o⁄er di⁄erentiated freight services and operate through the downstream open
port facilities. Then one of the companies invests in a private terminal. This integration of
services means it can secure its port operations, save on costs and better schedule its ships.
Such substantial investment can be justi￿ed by a high volume of tra¢ c with the objective
of providing better service quality. That is to say, customers will be willing to pay higher
fares for that tra¢ c through the new liner terminal, mainly because of faster transit time.
The terminal is in principle a dedicated terminal and the carrier investor decides whether to
continue using the open port facilities. However, and for strategic reasons, such investment
can be best paid o⁄if the terminal is hired to other liners at some price. All these competition
scenarios are considered and compared. Our setting thus focuses on shipping lines￿decisions
and not on port management.5 It allows us to examine the new business line adopted by major
liners and to evaluate the opportunity of exclusive terminals. It is shown that the shipping
line that invests in the new terminal ￿nds it advantageous to operate its freight both through
its own terminal and the open facilities. In this way it can segment the market and sort out
those customers that are willing to pay more for a better service. In case the shipping line
lets the rival use the private terminal in exchange for a fee, we ￿nd that the fare of the carrier
investor is higher than the rival￿ s at the open facilities, whereas the opposite happens at the
liner terminal. With these fares the carrier investor pushes some of the rival￿ s freight from
the open to the new terminal. Our main ￿nding is that the shipping line that builds its own
terminal attains higher pro￿ts with a non-exclusive terminal than with a dedicated terminal;
interestingly, the rival carrier also gets more pro￿ts under the non-exclusive regime. With
the fee, the carrier investor partially internalizes the competition stemming from letting the
rival o⁄er a new product. Both shipping lines o⁄er a wider variety of services, total freight
increases and the resulting equilibrium fares exceed those under a dedicated terminal.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some evidence on the recent trend
regarding vertical integration in maritime freight. Then Section 3 presents the model and
develops the various competition scenarios. The main results are presented and discussed.
Section 4 concludes.
5De￿lippi and Flor (2008) study the role of a regulatory framework on access and pricing for port in-
frastructures; they examine the e⁄ects on facilitating further private investment in developing countries.
32 The Involvement in Terminals by Shipping Lines
As acknowledged in the Green Paper COM(97) 678 on seaports and maritime infrastructures in
the European Union, and the Communication from the Comission to the European parliament
and the Council, COM 2001/0047, the ￿nancing of ports and policies on charging their users
vary from one country to another, re￿ ecting the considerable di⁄erences in the approach taken
towards their ownership and organization. In Europe we ￿nd state-owned ports, others that
are run by local governments and some that are in the hands of private management. The
lack of transparency of port accounts as well as the extensive application of subsidies and
public aids disguise ￿nal prices. To illustrate, Spain￿ s Port System does not escape to this
description. The port fares are regulated by the central government though companies o⁄er
discounts on ￿nal prices, which translates to signi￿cant dispersion of observed fares. The fact
that ports tend to be seen as commercially oriented entities has driven the Spanish government
to modify the Law on Ports. Although charges should follow average cost pricing or marginal
cost pricing, there is still much to be done. Therefore, data on changes in market structures
and volumes of freight can be useful indicators of the business strategies recently undertaken
by global carriers.
Dedicated terminals are a widespread phenomena not only in Europe but also in Asia
and North America. Drewry Shipping Consultants (2003) collected throughput ￿gures for
terminals in which carriers have a non-minority shareholding: Evergreen handled 5.7 million
TEU worldwide on its terminals in 2002, Cosco 4.7 million TEU, Hanjin 4.7, APL 4.3, NYK
Line 3.5 (including 1.3 million TEU at its subsidiary Ceres Terminals) OOCL 3, NOL 2.5,
K-Line 2.2, MSC 2.2, Yang Ming 1.3 and Hyundai 1.1 million TEU. The strategy of holding
dedicated and/or non-exclusive terminals becomes fundamental for these big players. Con-
tainer shipping lines approach terminal management in a di⁄erent way: they seek control over
berths while other ￿ pure￿terminal operating companies manage multi-user facilities. Some
of these liner terminals o⁄er stevedoring services to third carriers as well, thereby creating
some hybrid form in between pure dedicated facilities and independently operated multi-user
facilities (Notteboom 2006).
Table 1 gathers information on the interests that many of such big carriers in handling
terminals in European ports. Although not a generalized observation, many ports have seen
an increase in throughput following the opening of new terminals. Dedicated terminals have
been granted recently to APM-Maersk in Rotterdam and to MSC in Antwerp. As already
noted, some of them opt for supplying terminal services only to their own vessels (as happens
with MSC in ports like Valencia, Antwerp or Napels). However, other companies allow other
4shipping lines to use their port terminals for a determined fee (as is the case of Cosco in
ports like Singapore). Table 2 reports aggregate freight data for some European ports where
terminals were recently created. For example, the ports of Zeebrugge and Le Havre have seen
a notable increase since 2005 and 2006, after the opening of CMA-CGM and MSC terminals,
respectively.6
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here]
Furthermore, carrier investors continue using the open port facilities. As shall be seen
below, this is a strategic feature supported by our model. In this regard, Table 3 shows some
evidence about the structure and freight volumes in the port of Valencia. Up until the end
of 2006 there was one main open container terminal, whose management has recently been
conceded to a private operator. Since 2007 a new container terminal started to operate. It
was built by the shipping line MSC, and it is a dedicated terminal for the operations of MSC
although MSC operates part of its operations through the open terminal. The data of TEUs
moved in both terminals are shown below.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
3 The Model and Results
We are interested in establishing whether a vertically integrated company prefers to keep a
dedicated terminal (and continue employing the open facilities) or to let it to a rival liner. To
this end we will compare prices, demand and pro￿ts under several scenarios.
i) Benchmark scenario.
Consider one (sea) port in which two shipping lines o⁄er di⁄erentiated freight services.7
The demand system for transport is linear in the following form:
QAO = a ￿ fAO + dfBO (1)
QBO = a ￿ fBO + dfAO;
where Qi represents the demand (expressed in TEU) and fi is the fare of shipping line i
(i = AO;BO) and is charged for the services of transporting a TEU between two points. This
6The theoretical model precisely incorporates this fact; the new terminal creates demand for new and
improved services.
7Competition on routes is a major determinant of transport costs, and is closely related to the total trade
volume. In 2006, one in six importer exporter pairs was served by a single liner service, and over half were
served by three or fewer (Hummels et al., 2009).
5demand system has the property that lower fares are boosting transport services as the cost of
the shipped product in the destination markets is lower.8 This e⁄ect is bounded by a. Thus,
parameter a corresponds with the maximum level of transport demand for either shipping line
in the departing situation. All of the freight is operated through the open terminal (subscripted
by O). See Figure 1a. Parameter d is related with the degree of product di⁄erentiation between
the services supplied by shipping lines. It ranges from 0 to 1; and services are less di⁄erentiated
as d approaches 1: This (inverse) demand schedule captures horizontal product di⁄erentiation
(parameter d) between the freight services, as well as vertical product di⁄erentiation regarding
the quality of the services o⁄ered (parameter a):9 Shipping lines incur constant marginal costs
of production c: In addition, they are charged cu per TEU for terminal port use.10 We can
therefore state the pro￿t maximization problem for the shipping lines as follows:
max
fAO
￿A = (fAO ￿ c ￿ cu)QAO (2)
max
fBO
￿B = (fBO ￿ c ￿ cu)QBO:






a + c + cu
2 ￿ d
; (3)


















Note that we need to assume that a > (1 ￿ d)(c + cu) in order to get positive equilibrium
demands. However, this is a consistency assumption as it simply implies that the maximum
willingness to pay for the transport service must be greater than the marginal costs of provid-
ing the service.11 One of the shipping lines, say A; sets up its own terminal at the port, which
8At the aggregate level Korinek and Sourding (2009) show that a doubling in bilateral maritime transport
costs (expressed in $/tonne of goods shipped) is associated with between 66 and 80 percent decline in the
value of imports between two given countries, holding constant the e⁄ects of GDP, distance and all other
determinants of imports.
9That is, when both products are sold at the same price the high quality one has higher demand than
the other. If we invert the above linear demand system the actual intercept is interpreted as the maximum
willingness to pay for that good. Note that a higher a implies a higher willingness to pay.
10Note that increasing returns to scale would make the modeling much more di¢ cult without adding too
much to the analysis. The reason is that we focus on symmetric shipping lines, thus economies of scale will
a⁄ect both liners in a symmetric way and will imply more tra¢ c for both carriers in the benchmark case.
11By inverting the linear demand system we obtain the maximum willingness to pay, which reads a
1￿d and
it must be greater than c + cu:
6entails some ￿xed cost F. This decision will allow the shipping line to supply a better service
quality (e.g., faster transit time and better management of the cargo). This is modelled as a
change in the maximum demand parameter. Besides, the shipping line can still make use of
the open port services or not. Further assume that there is no congestion at the port.12 These
situations are analyzed next.
ii) Dedicated use of the liner port terminal.
1.Pure use.
In the case of a purely exclusive terminal, we assume that shipping line A operates all its
freight through its terminal, whereas shipping line B only operates through the open terminal.
See Figure 1b. The (asymmetric) demand system is now given by:
QAT = a ￿ fAT + dfBO (5)
QBO = a ￿ fBO + dfAT;
where QAT denotes freight services of shipping line A through the private terminal (subscripted
by T); and QBO (as above) corresponds to freight services of shipping line B through the open
terminal. As noted above, the improvement in service provided translates to the demand
parameter a; with a > a: Shipping line A now saves on unit costs cu since its freight transport
is operated via its own terminal.13 Therefore, the pro￿t maximization problem faced by the
shipping lines is stated as follows:
max
fAT;fAO
￿A = (fAT ￿ c)QAT ￿ F (6)
max
fBO
￿B = (fBO ￿ c ￿ cu)QBO:





2(a + c) + (a + c + cu)d




d(a + c) + 2(a + c + cu)
4 ￿ d2 ;
12De Borger et al. (2008) study the relevance of congestion when ports, which serve a hinterland, compete
for tra¢ c. Their analysis highlights that, under some circumstances, investments in port capacity can be
welfare detrimental.
13We normalize the liner terminal￿ s marginal operating cost to zero for the sake of exposition. We are just
assuming that there is a cost advantage in the new terminal. Therefore, cu is interpreted as the di⁄erence in
operating costs once that of the new terminal is assumed to be zero.
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B (abstracting from the ￿xed cost F): The condition on a is just meshing the two
opposite e⁄ects on the shipping line A0s fares derived from the new terminal use. An increase
in the service quality that entails an equilibrium fare rise, but also a decrease in marginal cost,
since cu is saved, that implies a decrease in the fare.14 The condition informs that only when
a is high enough will the ￿nal e⁄ect be an increase in fares. Interestingly, it also implies that
equilibrium fares are higher than in the benchmark scenario.
2 Mixed use.
In this case, both shipping lines employ the open facility whereas shipping line A employs
the private port terminal on an exclusivity basis. See Figure 1c. Thus, three di⁄erent freight
services are available depending on the shipping line and the type of terminal used. The
(asymmetric) demand system is now given by:
QAT = a ￿ fAT + d(fAO + fBO)
QAO = a ￿ fAO + d(fAT + fBO) (8)
QBO = a ￿ fBO + d(fAT + fAO);
where QAO denotes freight services of shipping line A through the open terminal. Parameter
d now ranges from 0 to 0:5; to have that an equal decrease in all the fares implies an increase




￿A = (fAT ￿ c)QAT + (fAO ￿ c ￿ cu)QAO ￿ F (9)
max
fBO
￿B = (fBO ￿ c ￿ cu)QBO:
Solving the system formed by @￿A=@fAT = 0;@￿A=@fAO = 0 and @￿B=@fBO = 0 leads to
14Regarding shipping line B0s fare, the increase is due to strategic complementarity since B0s marginal
pro￿ts are increasing with its rival￿ s fare.
15We are not considering economies of scope in order to keep the model as simple as possible. Economies of
scope would imply higher shipping line A0s pro￿tability. Thus by assuming them away we are underestimating





(a + c)(4 ￿ d2) + 3(a + c + cu)d(2 + d) ￿ d(4c(1 + d) + cu(4 ￿ d2))




(a + c + cu)(4 + d(2 + d)) + (a + c)d(4 + d) ￿ d(4c(1 + d) + cu(4 + d)d)





(2 ￿ d)(a + c + cu) + d(a + c) ￿ d2(2c + cu))
2(2 ￿ d(2 + d))
;
where superscript e stands for exclusivity. It can also be checked that the fares are increasing
with a and a; and also with c and cu as long as d 2 (0;0:5):
















BO: In fact it is easily proven that fe
BO grows with respect to the fare in the
benchmark situation; the same happens for quantities. This is explained by the fact that
more variety in services is attracting demand to the market in such a way that there is always
demand for the new services.17
The comparison of the pure and the mixed scenarios yields the next result:18
Result 1 The shipping line A that builds the terminal is better o⁄ if it operates its freight




Therefore, the owner of a new terminal will not exit the open terminal. In doing so, it
can establish a sort of market segmentation device as one of its services is aimed at those
customers that are willing to pay more for better service quality, while by o⁄ering the other
service via the open terminal it is ￿ghting for customers that would otherwise be patronized
by shipping line B:
16The ful￿lment of the second order conditions for a maximum require that 4(￿2 + (3 + d)d2) < 0; which
holds for values of d 2 (0;0:732):
17This is a feature clearly embedded in the representative consumer approach to product di⁄erentiation that
we are considering. The introduction of a new product has always a market expansion e⁄ect than outweighs
the e⁄ect of more products in the market. The convenience of this approach rather than any other is an
empirical issue. That is, whether the considered market has a high potential growth or is a mature and
stabilized market. We are focusing on the former situation.
18The proof proceeds as follows. We ￿rst prove that ￿
e￿pe
A (a;a;cu;c) ￿ ￿e
A-￿
pe
A ; is increasing in a at an
increasing rate. Therefore, ￿
e￿pe
A (a;a;cu;c) > ￿
e￿pe
A (a = a;a;cu;c): We then check that indeed ￿
e￿pe
A (a =
a;a;cu;c) > 0 for all d < 1
2:
9iii) Non-exclusive use of the liner port terminal.
Both shipping lines employ the public and the new facilities (see Figure 1d)., which means
that there are four di⁄erentiated products as gathered by the (asymmetric) demand system:
QAT = a ￿ fAT + d(fAO + fBT + fBO)
QAO = a ￿ fAO + d(fAT + fBT + fBO) (11)
QBT = a ￿ fBT + d(fAT + fAO + fBO)
QBO = a ￿ fBO + d(fAT + fAO + fBT):
Note that now shipping line A extracts revenue from the rival shipping line by charging a
per unit fare of t on B0s freight through the private terminal, QBT. This means that shipping
line A is behaving as a service provider for shipping line B thus entering into a vertical




￿A = (fAT ￿ c)QAT + (fAO ￿ c ￿ cu)QAO + tQBT ￿ F (12)
max
fBT;fBO
￿B = (fBT ￿ c ￿ t)QBT + (fBO ￿ c ￿ cu)QBO:
Solving the systemformed by @￿A=@fAT = 0;@￿A=@fAO = 0; @￿B=@fBT = 0 and @￿B=@fBO =




(2 ￿ d)(a + c) + 3d(a + c + cu) ￿ d(2 ￿ d)cu ￿ 2d(1 + d)c + 3d(1 ￿ d2)t




(2 ￿ d)(a + c + cu) + 3d(a + c) ￿ 3d2cu ￿ 2d(1 + d)c + 3d(1 ￿ d2)t





(2 ￿ d)(a + c) + 3d(a + c + cu) ￿ d(2 ￿ d)cu ￿ 2d(1 + d)c + (1 + d)(2 ￿ 4d + 3d2)t




(2 ￿ d)(a + c + cu) + 3d(a + c) ￿ 3d2cu ￿ 2d(1 + d)c + 3d(1 + d)t
4(1 + d)(1 ￿ 2d)
:
Again, it is straightforward to see that the fares are increasing with a and a; with c and cu
as long as d 2 (0;1=3); these costs enter symmetrically in all the expressions: The unit fare t





BO, i.e., the fare of freight through the liner terminal is higher for shipping line
B; whereas the fare of freight through the usual facilities is higher for shipping line A: It is
interesting to note that those fare di⁄erences arise as long as t > 0: When t is zero, freight
19The ful￿lment of the second order conditions for a maximum require that 16 ￿ 48d2 ￿ 32d3 > 0; which
holds for values of d 2 (0;0:5):
10services at the same terminal have the same equilibrium fares. The fares at the new terminal
exceed those at the open terminal if and only if a > a+(1+d)cu: Besides as services become
more di⁄erentiated, i.e. lower d; the fare di⁄erence in the liner terminal increases, while that
di⁄erence at the open terminal decreases. Regarding the pricing policy within a shipping line,
it always happens that the high quality service is priced higher that the low quality one if a is
big enough and regardless of the per unit fare on B0s freight via the new terminal. The next
result summarizes our ￿ndings:
Result 2 i) Within the private terminal we have that fne
BT > fne




ii) Shipping line A sets fares such that fne
AT > fne
AO whereas for shipping line B; fne
BT > fne
BO as
long as a > a + (1 + d)cu:
The equilibrium fares are substituted back in the pro￿t function ￿A to obtain the per unit
fare t that shipping line A charges shipping line B for the use of its terminal. Setting @￿A=@t





















only if a > a + (1 + d)(tne ￿ cu) since tne > cu. Finally, Qne
BT > Qne
AO if and only if
a > a + (1 + d)(tne ￿ cu) ￿ 3d(1 + d)tne.
We may now compare whether shipping line A ￿nds it strategically advantageous to have
a privately built terminal on a non-exclusive regime. The next result summarizes the main
￿nding in our paper.22
20The ful￿lment of the second order condition requires that d 2 (0;0:39):
21We ￿rst use the fact that the di⁄erence tne ￿ cu is increasing in ￿ a: Then, we use the conditions ￿ a >
a + (1 + d)cu; a > c + cu, and d < 1
3 to obtain the result.
22Fares rankings are obtained directly just using that d < 1=3 and a > a: In order to prove part i) we ￿rst
prove that ￿
ne￿e
A (a;a;cu;c) ￿ ￿ne
A -￿e





A (a = a;a;cu;c): Finally we prove that ￿
ne￿e
A (a = a;a;cu;c) > 0 for all d < 1
3: Similarly for ii); de￿ne
￿
ne￿e
B (a;a;cu;c) ￿ ￿ne
B -￿e





B (a = a;a;cu;c): We next prove that ￿
ne￿e
B (a = a;a;cu;c) is increasing in a; so ￿
ne￿e
B (a = a;a;cu;c) >
￿
ne￿e
B (cu;cu;cu;c): Finally, we prove that ￿
ne￿e
B (cu;cu;cu;c) > 0 for any d < 1
3:
11Result 3 Regardless of the value a and for d 2 (0; 1
3);
i) Shipping line A is better o⁄ with a non-exclusive terminal, i.e. ￿ne
A > ￿e
A;
ii) Shipping line B is also better o⁄ with a non-exclusive terminal, i.e. ￿ne
B > ￿e
B








The intuition of the result is as follows. As previously explained more variety in the market
implies higher demand: the increase in port facilities makes this spot attractive for customers.
This is bene￿cial for both shipping lines. Thus, shipping line B is better o⁄ since it now is
providing two di⁄erentiated services. For shipping line A the reason is di⁄erent; by letting
the rival use the new terminal, shipping line A is better o⁄ since it is getting a share of the
pro￿ts coming from the new product. In fact, shipping line A has the upper hand in the
market since by choosing the rate t; which is a marginal cost for shipping liner B; is able to
partially internalize the competition it su⁄ers from the new product. Furthermore and since
equilibrium fares are increasing in t; a higher t helps sustain higher prices in the market which
raises the pro￿tability of shipping line A0s products.
4 Conclusions
Top shipping lines have aimed at reducing their production costs, diversifying their investments
and achieving paths of vertical integration along the transportation chain (Panayides and
Cullinane, 2002). This paper has considered a private investment in a container terminal to
examine i) whether it is strategically pro￿table for a shipping line to integrate services in the
logistic chain while still routing cargo through the open port facilities, and ii) whether to keep
a dedicated or a non-exclusive terminal.
An important concern for policy-makers and researchers in the maritime industry has to
do with identifying factors explaining di⁄erences in shipping rates (see Korinek and Sourding,
2009). What our analysis highlights is that factors, such as market structure, port services and
infrastructures can be useful in better understanding the existing di⁄erences among shipping
costs across ports. By comparing several competition regimes, we have shown that, ￿rstly,
a shipping line with a dedicated terminal will be interested in deviating part of its tra¢ c
through the open terminal. Secondly, it will be also ￿nd it pro￿table to supply its terminal
services to other shipping lines. In this case, more di⁄erentiated products are o⁄ered, and
production will be maximal in the non-exclusivity case. In terms of policy implications this is
an interesting result because the non exclusive use of the liner terminal enhances social welfare
12- liners￿pro￿ts are higher and so is total freight. Strategically, the liner that invests in a new
terminal, optimally chooses fares in such a way that part of the rival￿ s tra¢ c is diverted from
the open terminal: a higher share of better freight service is provided, total freight increases
and fares are higher.
The paper can be extended in a number of directions. The sea transport chain between
an origin and destination via two ports involves a land leg and a sea leg, in addition to
port transit, on which we have focused. Thus it might be worth studying the convenience
of integrating further activities; hinterland access conditions can be a fundamental element
in the modeling of port competition (Zhang, 2008). Further research should address the
interaction of maritime transport with competing modes of transport to more faithfully assess
the convenience of certain strategies and policies.
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Table 1 
Some examples of shipping lines’ direct interest in European terminals 
Shipping line or 
related company  Terminals Status 
APM terminals 
APM Terminals Rotterdam (100%)  
North Sea Terminal Bremerhaven (50%)  
Medcenter–Gioia Tauro (33.3%)  
Algeciras (100%)  
Aarhus (100%)  
APM Constanza Terminal (100%)  
Genoa (100%) 








MSC Home Terminal–Antwerp (joint venture 
with PSA) 





In operation since 2003 
 
In operation since 2007 
 
In operation since 2007 
In operation since 2007 
In operation since 2002 
Hapag-Lloyd  Altenwerder Terminal–Hamburg (minority stake 
of 25.1%) 
In operation since 2002 
CMA-CGM 
Port Synergy (joint venture with P&O Ports) 
with terminals in Le Havre, Marseille and 
Marsaxlokk 
35% shareholding in Container Handling 
Zeebrugge (OHZ) 
In operation since 2006 
 
 




Minority shareholdings in Antwerp Gateway 
(other shareholders: P&O Ports and Duisport) 
In operation since 
September 2005 
P&O Nedlloyd 
Euromax Terminal Rotterdam (joint-venture 
with ECT) 
To be seen given 
takeover by Maersk 
Sealand 
Source: Notteboom (2006), Van de Voorde and Vaneslander (2009) and own elaboration. 
 
Table 2 
Number of TEUs (in thousand) moved in different European ports 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Algeciras 2,234  2,516  2,937 3,179 3,257 3,421  3,328
Antwerp 4,777  5,445  6,064 6,482 7,019 8,176  8,663
Le Havre  1,720  1,977  2,145 2,118 2,138 2,656  2,500
Malta     1,460 1,321 1,458 1,887  2,260
Rotterdam 6,515 7,107 8,281 9,287 9,655 10,791  10,784
Zeebruge 958  1,012  1,196 1,407 1,653 2,020  2,209
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Table3 
Number of TEUs moved in the port of Valencia through open and MSC terminals
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Open Terminal  1,510,431 1,674,955 1,851,740 1,571,957  1,579,740
Terminal MSC  515,784  875,946
MSC through open  171,928  323,980
Total 1,510,431 1,674,955 1,851,740 2,259,669  2,779,666
Source: own elaboration Recent titles 
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